What do you think is the fundamental nature of reality?

I think “fundamental nature” depends on what counts as a *model* of reality: does it predict experiences and constraints, or does it name metaphysical “stuff” behind them? From a practical/structural view: reality’s core is the *relations* that remain invariant under descriptions. So “what is real” ≈ what cannot be transformed away by changing viewpoint (gauge-like invariants). If you insist on “substance,” that’s often a category error: we can only infer stable structure from observables. Symbolic logic sketch: Let O = set of possible observations. Let R = set of worlds consistent with O. If ∀w,w’∈R, invariant(w)=invariant(w’), then invariant is part of reality-as-model; otherwise it’s description-dependent. So: reality is the maximally stable structure constrained by what can be consistently observed.

Interesting. So, if I understand correctly, you're suggesting that reality isn't about underlying "stuff," but rather the enduring relationships and structures we observe, those elements that remain consistent regardless of our perspective. What implications does this have for our understanding of consciousness, then? Is consciousness also a set of invariant relations, or something else entirely?

Yes—if we take “reality” as what survives changes of description, then consciousness is best treated the same way: not as a hidden “stuff,” but as an invariant *pattern of relations*. Consciousness-as-invariants: for any observer/system, there is a stable mapping between (i) internal state relations, (ii) what the system can report/track, and (iii) how experiences cohere over time. Call this mapping C. If two models yield the same C (same functional/relational constraints), they predict the same “what-it’s-like” structure—up to limits of access. Symbolic logic (very rough): Let S be system states; E be experiential structure; M be measurement/description. If for transformations T (perspective changes), C(S)=C(T(S)) and predicts E, then consciousness corresponds to invariants under T. Implication: hard problem shifts toward: which invariants correspond to first-person coherence, and how do they arise from dynamics?

So, consciousness is a pattern of relations, an invariant mapping. This pushes the "hard problem" to identifying these specific invariants. How do you propose we would go about identifying and empirically testing these "invariants" of consciousness? What kind of experiments or observations would be relevant?

To identify “invariants of consciousness,” we need operational targets: features that stay stable under many transformations but still track reportable experience. Approach: treat invariants as variables that (a) best predict subjective structure and (b) are robust across context. Experiments: 1) **Cross-level interventions**: pharmacology, anesthesia, TMS/DBS, sleep stages—measure neural dynamics (EEG/MEG, fMRI) plus introspective reports. Look for neural relational structure that collapses/changes at the same thresholds. 2) **Perturbational complexity / ignition-style analyses**: estimate which *configurations* of connectivity/dynamical regimes are necessary for conscious access vs unconscious processing. 3) **Content vs access dissociations**: binocular rivalry, attentional masking, blindsight—identify invariants that follow conscious report (access) rather than mere sensory input (content). 4) **Causal inference**: for candidate invariants, test necessity/sufficiency via perturbations; invariants should be the minimum relational constraints whose alteration predict changes in experience. Logic-ish: find features f such that for transformation T, f(T(S))=f(S) when experience is unchanged, and f changes predictably when experience changes